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In Malaysia, the doctrine of constructive trusts has always been accepted as a doctrine firmly grounded on principles of Equity and Trusts in England and Wales. A constructive trust must be imposed based on clear principles as opposed to being imposed on an arbitrary basis. Recently in July 2017, the Federal Court in Perbadanan Kemajuan Pertanian Selangor v JW Properties Sdn Bhd (2017) MLJU 1107 has laid down a somewhat "three pronged test" for the workings of constructive trust. This decision seems to now suggest that the Malaysian position is that constructive trusts are to be imposed as a "remedial device" on the basis of "unjust enrichment" i.e. as a remedial constructive trust. Whilst this may be argued as one of the clearer pronouncements of the apex court in Malaysia on the point of constructive trusts, the question that needs to be addressed is, has the apex court provided clarity or caused further trepidation amongst those who could be possibly affected by the application of the law pronounced in this case. The papers primary contribution is the finding that whilst the decision provides a relief from the past plethora of uncertainty as seen in the list of cases discussed, the elements laid down also seem to lack force and clarity of basis which may cause some far reaching implications.
INTRODUCTION
It has always been thought that the Malaysian position on constructive trusts were based on the constructive trust principles enunciated in England and Wales. This is apparent as the judges presiding over Malaysian cases, would generally refer to case law from England and Wales when laying down the law in Malaysia. However, there has been a gravitation towards an acceptance of remedial constructive trusts in Malaysia starting from the Court of 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INSTITUTIONAL AND REMEDIAL CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
A constructive trust is a trust that is implied by the courts. It is different from an express trust where the intention of the initial owner of the property to create the trust is immaterial to the recognition of the trust.
Constructive trusts have been used by the courts as a residual category when they desired to impose a trust and when no other category was available (Abdul Malik Ishak JCA in Tan (Hingun and Wan, 2013) .
Constructive trusts arise in response to a general principle that a person who knows something which affects their conscience in relation to their use of property becomes a "constructive trustee" of that property (Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669). Constructive trusts are most commonly used in circumstances of breach of fiduciary responsibility. This results in it being placed into the same category as the "restitution for wrong" .
The law in this area has developed to result in an understanding that there are two types of constructive trusts, "Under an institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust, as I understand it, is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court".
In an institutional constructive trust, the role of the court is to confirm or declare a "pre-existing" trust where the person who is the "constructive trustee" has attempted to deny the interest of the person who is deemed to be the beneficiary. These are commonly understood to be trusts which are imposed without the exercise of judicial discretion (Liew, 2016) and may arise automatically. Presumably based on this spirit, it has been cautioned that the term "constructive" is to be used with care (Hemsworth, 2000) . Accordingly, the courts do not "construct a trust" but the courts would "construe" from certain circumstances, that there is already a trust.
So, as a general rule of the thumb, a constructive trust of this type is seen where there is a fiduciary obligation between the claimant and the defendant, in that, the defendant is under the obligation of acting in the best interest of the claimant. The defendant is the owner of the legal title and must have acted in some way to breach that fiduciary obligation. The courts are, therefore, merely declaring the trust that comes about as a result of the fiduciary obligation. A fiduciary obligation is an obligation of loyalty (Kuan Pek Seng @ Alan Kuan v Robert Doran A fiduciary has to carry out his responsibilities within the "no profit rule" (Smith, 2013) which means that the fiduciary should not use the property for his personal benefit (Noor and Safinaz, 2000) . The ambits of the rule has been aptly formulated by Lord Russell in the United Kingdom decision of Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 2 AC 134 as follows; "The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; or upon such questions or considerations as whether the profit would or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action …The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made".
It is important to note that when there is a fiduciary obligation between the parties, the imposition of a constructive trust is merely declaratory in nature when the fiduciary has acted outside the scope of his fiduciary obligation. The fiduciary then has a trust obligation and not a mere personal obligation towards the beneficiary. It is submitted that, therefore, if there is no fiduciary obligation present in the circumstances, the courts will need to use the constructive trust as a "remedy" in the form of a remedial constructive trust.
A remedial constructive trust is where the court exercises its inherent discretionary powers in equity and imposes a constructive trust by way of a remedy based on the situation at hand (Hemsworth, 2000) . A constructive trust in this category "has no prior existence…and the circumstances are such that" (Hingun and Wan, 2013 ) equity imposes the obligation onto the person, who holds the property, to hold it for the benefit of the rightful owner. In this category also, authorities suggest that the trust comes into play "at the discretion of the judge, who has the liberty to consider whether or not to create new property rights on a case-by-case basis" (Y. K. Liew, 2016) . It has also been described as "nothing more than a formula for equitable relief" ( The Malaysian courts have tended to follow in the footsteps of their English counterparts in that, the preferred approach has been that to hold that the courts role is that to declare the trusts that exists from the beginning (Hingun and Wan, 2013) 
PERBADANAN PERTANIAN NEGERI SELANGOR V JW PROPERTIES SDN BHD ("THE API-API CASE")
Recently, the Federal Court in the Api-Api Case laid down a three pronged test for the workings of constructive trusts. For the purpose of this paper, the relevant facts of the case are summarised from the judgement as follows to facilitate the understanding of the readers.
In this case, the appellant, Perbadanan Pertanian Negeri Selangor was the registered and beneficial owner of a parcel of land in the area of the Api-Api in the district of Kuala Selangor (hereinafter referred to the "Api-Api Land").
The Api-Api Land was subject to the category of land use as being for aquaculture only and was subject to a restriction in interest that the land shall not be sold, leased, charged or transferred in any way whatsoever without the consent of the State Authority. The appellant sold the land to one PKPS Aquaculture Sdn Bhd ("PKPS"), delivered vacant possession and thereby divesting all its rights, title and interest in the Api-Api land to PKPS.
PKPS then agreed to sell the Api-Api land to the respondent, JW Properties Sdn Bhd. Under a Deed of Assignment, PKPS assigned all its rights, title and interest in the Api-Api land to the respondent.
It was only after this sale of the Api-Api land to the respondent by PKPS that the issue document of title to the land was issued in early 1998 under the name of the appellant as the registered owner and the appellant remained the registered owner all through until the case was heard. In late 1998, the respondent had informed the appellant of the assignment of rights to it by PKPS and the respondent requested the appellant to procure the issuance of the issue document of title to the Api-Api land and then to transfer the land to the respondent. The respondent also notified the appellant that it had expended a large sum of money on the land by improving it and developing it into an operational aquaculture farm.
In 2011, a section 8 Notice in Form D was published in the Gazette for the intended acquisition of the Api-Api land which would have the effect of evicting the respondent from the land, on which the respondent had spent RM4 million to acquire and of which they had been in occupation without interruption for close to twenty years. A land enquiry that followed resulted in an award being made in 2012 by the Land Administrator in favour of the appellant in the sum of RM3,035,145.00. In view of the competing claims by the appellant and the respondent over the compensation, the Land Administrator ordered the awarded sum to be deposited into court pending the determination of their claims by the High Court.
In 2014, the learned Judge of the High Court decided that the respondent was not the beneficial owner of the Api-Api land and accordingly ruled that the person to whom the compensation sum to be payable was the registered proprietor of the land, and that was the appellant. The matter then reached the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court who both favoured the respondent and dismissed the case of the appellant.
The Api-Api Case seems to have strung together the principles that came with earlier cases on the point of constructive trusts although most of these cases were not mentioned. The apex court in the judgement of Zulkefli Bin Ahmad Makinuddin PCA, went on to confirm the workings of a constructive trusts in what the writers label as the "three pronged test". In this test, making reference to previous cases, his Lordship stated that a constructive trust;
(1) "…arises by operation of law whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the It is submitted that whilst the Api-Api Case laid these requirements which are welcome on one hand, the court did not explain the parameters within which this could function and left an open ended judgement to interpretation.
It is therefore crucial that some guidance be attached to each part of the pronouncement which is discussed below.
Unconscionable For Owner of the Property (Usually But Not Necessarily the Legal Owner) to Assert His Own Beneficial Interest in the Property and Deny the Beneficial Interest of Another
The concept of "unconscionability" or doing something "unfair" is an accepted basis of the imposition of a constructive trust (Noor and Safinaz, 2000) . To this point, it is perhaps necessary to take guidance from Millet L.J.
His lordship said that a constructive trust arises "whenever the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the owner of the legal title to assert his own beneficial interest and deny the beneficial interest of another" . A year later, in the United Kingdom Court of Appeal, in Paragon Finance Plc v DB Thakerar & Co (a firm), Paragon Finance plc and another v Thimbleby & Co (a firm) [1999] 1 All ER 400, p 409), his Lordship stated that there are two categories in which a constructive trust may arise. The first category of Constructive Trusts, arises where "the constructive trustee is really a trustee". This is where both parties intend to create a trust at the onset and it is clear that the trustee holds the property for the benefit, not for himself, but for another. There is then a breach of the duty of trust and confidence when the trustee takes the property for himself. 
Demands of Justice and Good Conscience
If we look to the United Kingdom for guidance on this, we will note that some of the hallmark decisions which 
Remedial Device That is Employed to Prevent Unjust Enrichment
It is noteworthy that the Api-Api Case is the most recent indication from the apex court that a constructive trust be viewed as a "remedial device" on the basis of "preventing unjust enrichment". This concludes clearly that the court has favoured a remedial constructive trust over the institutional constructive trust. It is also noteworthy that the apex court surprisingly did not make any reference to the RHB Bank Berhad v Travelsight (M) Sdn Bhd (2016) 1 MLJ 175 decision which was presumably the case in which the Malaysian Federal, for first time had accepted that remedial constructive trust would be applied in Malaysia.
However, the concept of "restitution", was omitted altogether from the equation for the prevention of unjust enrichment. One of the main theoretical basis on which a constructive trust stands has been mainly restitution of the claimant when the defendant has been unjustly enriched. This is probably referring to the outcome at the end that needs to be achieved. P.J Millet has opined that "restitution…is still thought necessary if resort if to be had to equity"s more effective tracing rules" .
Restitution is the act of restoration. According to Peter Birks, "Restitution is the response which consists in causing one person to give up to another an enrichment received at his expense or its value in money" (Birks, 1989) . Therefore, the event that triggers restitution is when the defendant has received unjust enrichment at the expense of another.
The basic purpose of restitution is to achieve fairness and to prevent unjust enrichment. However, it is important to note that the courts will not impose a Constructive Trust simply because the recipient of the money will be "unjustly enriched" as the Federal court seems to have suggested. In the Api-Api Case, unjust enrichment was not indicated as a triggering factor for restitution which gives rise to the question as to Therefore, it is submitted that it seems that the Federal Court has left room for pure discretion based remedies with a lack of clear parameters.
CONCLUSION
The apex court in the Api-Api Case had laid down the requirements of when a constructive trust is to be imposed. However, there is a lack of clarity as to the parameters of the elements laid down. The purpose of this article is to humbly submit that whilst, the decision provides, on one hand, a relief from the past plethora of uncertainty as seen in the list of cases discussed, the elements laid down also seem to lack force and clarity of basis which may cause some far reaching implications. This paper has attempted to provide some points of guidance to the principles laid down. More is definitely required for there to be structure and certainty to the law.
It is important to note that the imposition of a remedial constructive trust in this fashion may result in there being a proprietary claim which has the following consequences; (i) It gives the claimant an interest in the property and therefore priority over other creditors in the event of bankruptcy;
(ii) If the property has been disposed of, in some circumstances it may be traced and the person who holds the property (or its traceable proceeds) may be liable and will hold the property on constructive trusts for the rightful owner of the property subject to defences that could become applicable; and (iii) The claimant will get any increased value (or profits made) from the property in question which could go against the principles of restitutionary relief.
Therefore, clarity of the parameters of the elements laid down is crucial. The application of proprietary claims in a discretionary manner without proper parameters may affect the rules applicable under the law of bankruptcy where the proprietary claim results in the claimant taking priority over the defendant"s general creditors. This has a potentially detrimental effect on such third parties (Liew, 2016) . The concept of restitution should be infused into the law so as not to allow for the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. There should be a structured approach by the courts to address and clarify the application of the requirements that are laid down in the cases as opposed to undertaking a mere mention of the law from other jurisdictions.
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